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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay focuses on the interrelation of three legal doctrines that 
affect the allocation of ownership and attribution of products of the hu-
man mind. The first, corporate personhood, grants corporations rights of 
personhood similar to those of natural persons. The second, the work-
made-for-hire doctrine (WMFH) under copyright law, allocates owner-
ship and attribution for copyrightable works to the employer of the natu-
ral-person author—even where that employer is a nonnatural, legal per-
son such as a corporation. And the third, shop rights and the hired-to-
invent exception, permits courts to grant equitable licenses or assign-
ments to employers for their employees’ inventions. These three doc-
trines have very different backgrounds and rationales. Yet, they are in-
creasingly brought to bear simultaneously in innovative firms where cre-
ative works are developed that include copyrightable and patentable ele-
ments. 
At the same time, the three doctrines are inconsistent with regard to 
the result of their application to questions of allocation of ownership and 
attribution of creative works. As a preliminary matter, “ownership” 
means the right to the legal title of the creative work, whereas “attribu-
tion” means the right to claim recognition as the author or inventor of the 
creation. Corporate personhood accords corporations nonexclusive lists 
of enumerated powers, such as the power to own and convey property, 
together with catchall powers to do whatever is necessary or convenient 
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to achieve their business goals. These rights and powers seem to follow 
those of natural persons.1 On its own, this doctrine would seem to allow 
corporations to be authors and inventors in both ownership and attribu-
tion, similar to natural persons. But corporations are not natural persons, 
and they cannot be said to “create” or act in the real word in the way that 
human agents can. Thus, there is artificiality to this concept of corpora-
tions as authors or inventors. WMFH is partly consistent with corporate 
personhood, as it in certain situations grants ownership and attribution 
rights in works of authorship to the corporate person as employer (as dis-
cussed in Part III).2 By contrast, the common law doctrines of shop rights 
and the hired-to-invent exception, together with federal patent-law rules 
of inventorship, do not allow corporate inventors.3 At most, corporations 
can be assignees of patent titles and applications, which are given the 
attributes of personal property under the Patent Act.4 This rule gives the 
corporation ownership of the patent or application, but not attribution as 
inventor. Inventorship attribution is reserved for only natural-person in-
ventors, and the failure to list all of the natural-person inventors can in-
validate the patent.5 
The inconsistency in these doctrines and their application, even 
when written agreements between creators and corporate persons exist, is 
leading to uncertainty and litigation.6 This problem is likely to get only 
worse as corporations develop more “convergence” products that contain 
copyrightable and patentable elements, such as video games and 
smartphone applications. Accordingly, this Essay argues that Congress 
should amend both the Copyright Act and the Patent Act to harmonize 
the ownership and attribution allocation rules, while expressly preempt-
ing shop rights and the hired-to-invent exception under state common 
law. This harmonization would center on allocating ownership of inven-
tions and works of authorship to corporations, while still allocating at-
tribution inalienably to inventors and authors. In this way, firms would 
get the ownership rights they need to justify investment in the inventions 
and works, as well as to facilitate orderly development, manufacturing, 
                                                 
 1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 121–22 (West 2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 
(2011). 
 2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2011). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(c), 102(f) (2011); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 
v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192, 2194–95 (2011); United States v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.01 (2011). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. See, e.g., Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. at 2188; Larry Rohter, Record Industry Braces 
for Artists’ Battles Over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, at C1, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/08/16/arts/music/springsteen-and-others-soon-eligible-to-recover-song-rights.html 
?pagewanted=all. 
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and distribution of products embodying the inventions and works. At the 
same time, creators would be able to retain attribution rights crucial for 
their professional development and credentials. 
The Essay briefly reviews corporate personhood in Part II. It then 
outlines the background context and current state of the law governing 
authorship in Part III and inventorship in Part IV. Finally, Part V propos-
es that: (1) the WMFH provision in the Copyright Act be amended to 
grant inalienable attribution rights to the natural-person creators of copy-
rightable works; and (2) the Patent Act be amended to add a WMFH 
provision for patentable inventions that expressly preempts shop rights 
and the hired-to-invent exception under state common law, while also 
granting inalienable attribution rights to natural-person inventors of pa-
tentable inventions. 
II. CONCEPTS OF CORPORATE LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
The corporation as a legal concept is not limited to the business 
corporation, even though the majority of literature concerning corporate 
law treats it that way.7 The origins of the form and practice of incorpora-
tion are murky, with some commentators ascribing corporate or proto-
corporate forms to ancient Rome,8 and others to ancient India.9 This at-
tribution generally varies depending on whether one is looking for a legal 
entity meeting the standard legal criteria for a modern business corpora-
tion,10 or focusing solely on the indicia of a collection of individuals who 
have come together to act as one “corporate” body.11 Another point of 
distinction is between systems in which the corporation can be formed 
only as a privilege granted by a sovereign (“concession” systems) and 
those in which the incorporators have the right to form the entity after 
following certain formalities (“free-incorporation” systems). Contempo-
rary corporate law scholars primarily choose free-incorporation systems 
and the four criteria of the modern business corporation as the model of 
what they seek in the historical record. Accordingly, these scholars focus 
                                                 
 7. See Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of 
the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201 (2006). 
 8. ELLEN GOODMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: FROM THALES TO 
THE TUDORS 202 (1995); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract of Concession? An Essay on the History of 
Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873 (2000). 
 9. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Economic History of the Corporate Form in Ancient India 
(Jan. 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/ 
khanna_ancient_india_informal.pdf. 
 10. The four characteristics set out by Clark are the ones most often used: “(1) limited liability 
for investors; (2) free transferability of investor interests; (3) legal personality (entity-attributable 
powers, lifespan, and purpose); and (4) centralized management.” ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE 
LAW 2–4 (1986). 
 11. GOODMAN, supra note 8. 
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on the many early noncorporate forms of commercial enterprises (such as 
partnerships) that exhibit antecedents of such properties. 12  But these 
scholars then overlook the first actual entities formed as “corpora-
tions”—as discussed below—because they were generally not used for 
business purposes and required the concession of a sovereign. 
The term and concept “corporation” derived from the universitas, 
corpus, and collegium of Roman law.13 At its core, the concept relied on 
the transformation of individuals into one new corporate body.14 The es-
sential characteristic of incorporation was the voluntary joining of indi-
viduals into a formal community.15 Under Emperor Justinian, the state 
itself was conceived of as a unitary institution of individuals formed un-
der higher political authority.16 Municipalities and private organizations, 
including political clubs and trader guilds, were also conceived of as cor-
porations; they were groups of individuals who chose to become “one 
body” and to act and speak as one in certain matters. But these entities’ 
rights of legal personhood—such as the right to own property, to make 
contracts, and to sue and be sued—were entirely dependent on a grant 
from the sovereign, in true concession-system fashion.17 Christianity it-
self was self-organized as a corporation, in that the Church and its mem-
bers were taken quite seriously to be the body or corpus of Christ.18 This 
sense of group persona and purpose as the defining characteristics of a 
corporation also arose from the early Germanic genossenschaft, an asso-
ciation that constituted the household, warrior band, clan, or village.19 
In this sense, corporations were prolific in the Middle Ages and 
transcended the regular order of feudal, tribal, kinship, or clan affiliations 
because they were based on voluntary affiliations of mutual interests. 
Parts of the Church were also corporations, including abbeys, monaster-
ies, and individual churches or parishes. A major development came in 
the twelfth century when the Church as a whole declared itself a corpo-
rate entity that transcended any secular governments. As such, the 
Church did not need concessions from any of them to be an independent 
legal person. Because this move engendered conflict between the papacy 
                                                 
 12. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 
(2006). 
 13. GOODMAN, supra note 8. 
 14. Incorporation, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/incor 
porate?region=us&q=incorporation#incorporate__6 (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
 15. GOODMAN, supra note 8. This section is summarized from Goodman. 
 16. Id. 
 17. There is some evidence that before Emperor Augustus, such corporations could be formed 
without the concession of the state as a matter of free association. See J. A. C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK 
OF ROMAN LAW 469–75 (1976). 
 18. GOODMAN, supra note 8 (citing 1 Corinthians 12:27). 
 19. Id. 
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and the various royal sovereigns, this episode proved once again why 
sovereigns had good reason to be wary of independent, self-forming le-
gal persons beyond their control. Notwithstanding these issues of church 
and state, the concept of the corporation as a set of individuals who give 
up some of their rights to become mere members of a single corporate 
body arguably provides the best justification for granting corporations 
the status and rights of legal persons. In essence, this original form of 
corporation simply was a single legal person. 
By contrast, what we would consider to be sole proprietorships and 
partnerships tended to be more commercial in nature. For example, the 
Italian commenda of the late-Medieval and Renaissance periods was an 
early form of limited partnership based solely on contractual relation-
ships.20 The hallmark of these commercial organizations was that they 
were generally formed for a single venture or voyage.21 But many Eng-
lish courts would not enforce the contracts underlying the commenda 
form, and so British traders could not use it.22 This led to a further busi-
ness entity innovation, whereby traders would buy the charters of mori-
bund corporations that had been formed for other purposes to use instead 
for the traders’ business ventures.23 In other cases, the traders entered 
into contractual relationships and issued “joint stock” shares in a manner 
that functionally approximated a chartered corporation and would gener-
ally be enforced by British courts.24 
Paul Mahoney suggested that British traders’ practices could have 
led to the development of corporations based not on concession charter-
ing, but instead simply on evolved principles of contract, property, and 
possibly even tort law.25 But he pointed to Lord Coke’s declaration in the 
1612 Case of Sutton’s Hospital that incorporation could not legally occur 
without the concession and grant of privileges by the Crown as the turn-
ing point that thwarted the development of de facto contract-based corpo-
rations.26 Mahoney argued that notwithstanding this impact, Coke’s edict 
slowly but steadily lost much of its force over the next century, allowing 
creative lawyers and merchants to form de facto legal persons again.27 
But the passage of the Bubble Act by Parliament in 1719 once again 
                                                 
 20. Mahoney, supra note 8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross Country Comparison, 23 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 806 (2002). 
 24. Mahoney, supra note 8. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (citing The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 964–65). 
 27. Id. 
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brought an end to these pseudo-corporations.28 It would not be until 1825 
that the Bubble Companies Act would bring free incorporation to Eng-
land.29 
The development of free-incorporation systems for business corpo-
rations in Europe and the United States during the 1800s arguably began 
the ascendancy of the perspective that the only kind of corporation is the 
business corporation.30 While nonprofit and municipal corporations were 
still being formed in substantial numbers, attention became focused on 
the developing law regarding business corporations. This may be because 
the laws for business corporations were changing rapidly, especially by 
comparison to the statutes for nonprofit and municipal corporations. At 
the same time, the business corporation was becoming something quite 
different from its antecedents. 
In the United States, states began to compete for firms to incorpo-
rate within them because of the revenues obtained from corporate char-
ters, which included franchise fees and taxes, as well as the economic 
development that occurred when the firms also set up operations in the 
state.31 Corporate purpose requirements were loosened until they reached 
the modern standard that allows corporations to be formed simply “for 
any lawful purpose.”32 Stock par-value requirements, which were intend-
ed to keep a lid on favoritism and questionable stock grants, were re-
duced to de minimis amounts or even eliminated entirely.33 The term of 
the corporation’s existence was allowed to be perpetual (until or unless 
dissolved by the shareholders or by state action in highly egregious situa-
tions).34 Ultimately, loosening these requirements led to the twentieth-
century notion that corporations were perpetual profit-making ventures 
with the primary goal of wealth maximization for their shareholders.35 
Further, the rapid growth in the size of corporations and shareholder 
classes, together with the separation of owners and managers facilitated 
                                                 
 28. Bubble Act, 6 Geo., c. 18 (1719) (Eng.); Mahoney, supra note 8. 
 29. Bubble Companies Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (1825) (Eng.). 
 30. See O’Melinn, supra note 7; Pistor et al., supra note 23. 
 31. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 42 (3d ed. 2003); 
Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corpo-
rate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). 
 32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (West 2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 
(2011). 
 33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (classes of stock may have par value or no par val-
ue); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21 (board may determine the level of adequate value to be received 
in exchange for shares). 
 34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(1); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(1). 
 35. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 100 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
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by the rise of a professional managerial class, meant that any real notion 
of a common sense of purpose for the corporation—other than wealth 
maximization—evaporated.36 
Currently, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), estab-
lished by the American Bar Association, sets out a nonexclusive list of 
enumerated powers of personhood for corporations. But it also includes 
the catchall provision that, unless otherwise limited by its articles, a cor-
poration “has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary 
or convenient to carry out its business and affairs.”37 A number of juris-
dictions have substantially adopted the MBCA. Delaware, the leading 
jurisdiction for incorporation, has a different statute: the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law (DGCL). But the DGCL establishes powers of le-
gal personhood that include substantially similar analogues to those set 
out in the MBCA, including the catchall provision.38 Given the broad 
scope of these powers, one might expect that authorship and inventorship 
would easily be included within them. Yet, the current situation is a 
mixed bag because of superseding legal doctrines within federal law. 
Corporations can be authors under copyright law, but they cannot be in-
ventors under patent law. We turn now to each of these roles in the next 
two Parts. 
III. CORPORATIONS AS AUTHORS 
Under the WMFH provisions of the Copyright Act, employers and 
parties who commission the creation of copyrightable works can stand in 
as the sole author for such works.39 They need not acknowledge or give 
attribution to the natural-person creators, and they need not pay any extra 
compensation to secure title beyond whatever they already agreed to pay 
the employee or independent contractor. But the means of establishing 
                                                 
 36. This notion, of course, was a central driver and theme for Adolf Berle in The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 37. “Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual 
duration and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individual to do all 
things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs . . . .” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 3.02. 
 38. Delaware General Corporation Law provides as follows: 
In addition to the powers enumerated in . . . this title, every corporation, its officers, di-
rectors and stockholders shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges 
granted by this chapter or by any other law or by its certificate of incorporation, together 
with any powers incidental thereto, so far as such powers and privileges are necessary or 
convenient to the conduct, promotion or attainment of the business or purposes set forth 
in its certificate of incorporation. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(a). 
 39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2011). 
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the WMFH relationship differ as between employees and independent 
contractors. Employees are deemed to have submitted to the WMFH re-
lationship simply by being employees and creating a work within the 
scope of their employment. No writing is required. In fact, to alter this 
default, the employer and employee must enter into a signed writing spe-
cifically disclaiming the WMFH relationship. 40  By contrast, parties 
commissioning independent contractors must secure a writing expressly 
establishing the commissioned works as WMFH.41 Further, any work so 
commissioned must fit within one of nine enumerated categories of 
works.42 
One crucial consequence of applying WMFH status to a work is 
that it cuts off the termination rights that natural-person authors have 
when they assign or license their works.43 This termination right was 
added into U.S. copyright law as part of the Copyright Act of 1976,44 and 
as such it applies only to assignments and licenses executed after January 
1, 1978. The right vests thirty-five years after the execution of the grant 
and continues for five years from that date.45 Its purpose is to allow au-
thors the opportunity to get out of unfavorable deals they strike when 
they start out and have inadequate resources to value and negotiate for 
their rights.46 The termination right gives artists a second bite at the ap-
ple. Further, it is not waivable.47 Because the right first appeared in the 
1976 Act, the first termination windows are opening right now.48 Ac-
cordingly, the provision is only now being put to the test. So far, record 
                                                 
 40. Id. § 201(b). This rule has raised particularly interesting issues with regard to faculty schol-
arship and teaching materials, which are not resolved as easily as has been traditionally believed. See 
SEAN M. O’CONNOR ET AL., LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 60–63 (2010), available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/ 
PGA_058712. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 42. Id. The categories include works specifically ordered or commissioned as (1) a contribution 
to a collective work, (2) a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, (3) a translation, (4) a 
supplementary work, (5) a compilation, (6) an instructional text, (7) a test, (8) answer material for a 
test, or (9) an atlas. Id. A “supplementary work” is as follows: 
[A] work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for 
the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting 
upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial il-
lustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material 
for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes. 
Id. An “instructional text” is “a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with 
the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.” Id. 
 43. Id. § 203. 
 44. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 203. 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). 
 48. See, e.g., Rohter, supra note 6. 
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labels in particular are showing every sign of contesting termination no-
tices.49 The labels claim that the recording contracts the artists signed 
were actually WMFH agreements, with the artists characterized as either 
employees or independent contractors.50 The artists, in response, deny 
the WMFH interpretation and assert that the contracts were merely as-
signments or licenses.51 
While the contracts executed by major labels will likely turn out to 
be fairly clear as to whether or not they are WMFH—as they will have 
been drafted by highly experienced lawyers well-versed in the law—
contracts drafted by parties without access to sophisticated copyright at-
torneys may not be so easy to interpret. Based on my experience as a 
practicing intellectual property attorney, many business people and attor-
neys who are not copyright specialists fail to grasp the difference be-
tween WMFH, on the one hand, and assignments or licenses, on the oth-
er. Accordingly, I have reviewed many contracts that conflate the two. 
An independent-contractor agreement will sometimes purport to estab-
lish a WMFH commission, but the work in question will not fall into any 
of the nine enumerated categories. In other cases, an independent-
contractor agreement concerning a work that might not fit into one of the 
enumerated categories will adopt a “belt and suspenders” approach, in 
which a savings clause is added to effect an assignment in the event that 
a court finds that there is not a WMFH. This is a perfectly fine legal tac-
tic, and it will get the commissioner of the work at least some rights. But 
it means that the availability of the termination right cannot be known 
until or unless a court adjudicates whether the contract in fact effected a 
WMFH commission. Accordingly, we can expect a substantial amount of 
litigation in the coming years. 
The next Part examines how and why there can be no “corporate 
inventor” and thus no patent-law analogue to WMFH. The question then 
is why copyright law provides for WMFH. The remainder of this Part 
seeks to answer this by sketching some early history of the nature of au-
thorship in classical antiquity and the later development of copyright dur-
ing the West’s early modern period. 
In classical antiquity, there was no such thing as the creative, self-
expressing artist that we are so familiar with today.52 Works were created 
                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See PAMELA O. LONG, OPENNESS, SECRECY, AUTHORSHIP: TECHNICAL ARTS AND THE 
CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 7–10, 43–45 (2001); Mario 
Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte’s Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847 (2011). 
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as functional objects with pleasing elements.53 Much of what we would 
consider the “fine arts” today were considered the “imitative arts”—
imitating pleasing aspects of nature in painting, sculpture, and music.54 
Literary works were either factual treatises, allegorical stories, poetry, or 
drama intended to convey moral messages.55 Only poetry was considered 
to be “new” or original to the writer, though it was not attributed to the 
writer. Rather, it was seen as a manifestation of “divine madness,” in 
which the poet channeled supernatural messages.56 Concomitant with this 
absence of a sense of the creative genius of the artist was the absence of 
any sense that the “author” of a work had to be the natural persons who 
were producing part or all of it. Instead, the “author” was the person or 
entity who authorized the work to be produced, or the person or entity 
under whose authority it was produced.57 From these exemplars, it is 
clear how the term “author” arose in the first place.58 
This sense of the author as an authority helps explain why experts, 
learned men, and even rulers had books written using their name as the 
author, even where they neither crafted the content nor scribed the 
work.59 It was perfectly acceptable for them to be considered the author 
of the “new” work by having merely selected or edited the work of oth-
ers.60 This selected material could have been created through commission 
specifically for the new volume, or it could have been taken from preex-
isting content in other sources.61 In this way, there was neither copyright 
infringement (because there were no copyrights) nor plagiarism, even 
when exact passages were copied from the works of other authors. The 
role of the author was simply to put his imprimatur of authority on the 
volume.62 Readers wanted to know that a certain known expert had en-
dorsed the content, regardless of the source from which that content orig-
inated.63 Beyond this practice, during one period of European history, 
                                                 
 53. See Paul O. Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics 
(I), 12 J. HIST. IDEAS 496, 498–503 (1951). 
 54. See id. at 497. 
 55. LONG, supra note 52, at 7–10, 18–45. 
 56. Kristeller, supra note 53, at 500. 
 57. LONG, supra note 52, at 7–10, 16–45. 
 58. The word “author” arises in English from the Latin word auctor by way of Anglo-Norman 
word autor, which includes cognates. Author, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/author?region=us&q=author (last visited Apr.14, 2012). 
 59. LONG, supra note 52, at 7–10, 18–45. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 10–12. 
 63. Id. at 7–12. 
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merely being the patron of a creator’s work entitled the patron to be the 
sole attributed author.64 
Even after the Romantic sense of the artist as a creative genius pro-
ducing uniquely self-expressive works took root centuries later,65 it did 
not fully displace this sense of “author” as the one who commissions, 
oversees, or produces the work.66 This may be in part because many mas-
terworks required a staff of artisans to help fulfill the artist–author’s vi-
sion.67 Thus, Michelangelo and other great pre-Romantic artists’ prece-
dent of employing artisans charged with specific tasks as part of the 
overall project continued. Notwithstanding these contributions—many of 
which could be quite substantial—the studio director, such as Michelan-
gelo, retained the sole authorship of the final product. 
In sum, even as authorship developed from the authority under 
which a project was done to the person whose creative genius produced 
the work, there remained a sense that the author could still be the person 
or entity who commissioned or directed the project. But what does it re-
ally mean for a nonnatural legal person, such as a corporation, to have a 
vision for a work to be produced? Technically, it needs to only commis-
sion the work to be done. But the sense of “author” that emerged from 
the Romantic period was of the visionary genius who could envision and 
then produce, directly or through assistants, a masterwork. A corporation 
does not have this capacity, at least not in and of itself, separate from its 
members or directors. The older sense of the corporation as something 
that made its members into one body politic and allowed them to speak 
with one voice and act as one being in the world supports the Romantic 
sense of author on behalf of corporations. The vision to be authored 
could be the collective vision of the members and directors, such that the 
corporation could truly be considered the author. Unfortunately, the 
modern shareholder-wealth-maximization model of the business corpora-
tion does not support the Romantic model of authorship. Instead, share-
holders, directors, officers, employees, and other stakeholders all bring 
different and often competing positions to the table. It seems silly to say 
that there is any true collective voice of the modern, large business cor-
poration. Thus, the WMFH doctrine seems to be a curious legacy that 
does not really fit within the current corporate environment. 
                                                 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. See, e.g., Biagioli, supra note 52. 
 66. See supra note 58. 
 67. See, e.g., CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1800–1930, at 212–15 (2009). 
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IV. CORPORATIONS AND INVENTORS 
The patent system does not allow for nonnatural corporate persons 
to be inventors. While it is commonly understood that inventorship lies 
only in natural-person inventors, nothing in the Patent Act expressly 
states this.68 But the idea is generally understood to arise from various 
provisions within Title 35 as a kind of penumbral rule.69 Chisum stated 
that “[t]he presumptive owner of the property right in a patentable inven-
tion is the single human inventor.”70 The Patent Act establishes express 
rules of inventorship that seem to support this position.71  Further, in 
Stanford v. Roche, the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed this principle 
by citing its many precedents for the proposition that title vests only in 
inventors as an initial matter, not in their employers.72 
The problem is that these cases seem to assume that “inventors” 
must be natural persons based on the notion that only natural persons can 
produce inventions. For example, the Court states that “an inventor owns 
‘the product of [his or her] original thought.’”73 But, again, nothing in the 
Patent Act expressly provides that “inventors” can only be natural per-
sons. At the same time, it may be equally reasonable to hold that copy-
rightable works are “the product of [a natural person’s] original thought,” 
to use the Supreme Court’s statement about why inventors have to be 
natural persons.74 So this dictum should apply equally to copyrightable 
works. Perhaps, then, this is why the Copyright Act has its express 
WMFH provision; the default is that any products of the human mind 
belong to the sentient natural persons who alone can create them (in con-
trast to nonsentient corporate persons). Under this view the Copyright 
Act expressly legislated around this default for policy reasons by defin-
ing “author” as including corporate persons. This argument is addressed 
in more detail below. First, however, further exploration of the Patent 
Act’s treatment of inventorship is needed. 
In cases of joint inventorship, an “inventorship entity” that acts like 
a general partnership is created.75 Unlike a corporation, this is not an en-
tity with legal personhood status. Instead, it is a collective of inventors 
that allows each member to assign or license his or her rights to the pa-
                                                 
 68. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-953, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1−376). 
 69. Commentators generally point to 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(c), 102(f) (2011). 
 70. 8 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 22.01. 
 71. 35 U.S.C. § 116. 
 72. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188, 2194–95 (2011). 
 73. Id. (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., 1 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 3.08[2]. 
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tent. But because inventorship rights are indivisible, each joint inventor’s 
share covers the entirety of the patent, regardless of his or her inventive 
contribution.76 Thus, for example, any joint inventor’s license to a third 
party will destroy the ability of the other joint inventors to grant an ex-
clusive license. From these principles there arise two type of joinder 
problems. The first is nonjoinder, in which not all the true inventors are 
listed in the patent. This can invalidate the patent until it is remedied.77 
The second is misjoinder of inventors, in which an individual named as 
an inventor did not in fact make a substantial contribution to the inven-
tion. Misjoinder may be common, especially in large labs where a prin-
cipal investigator—the director of the lab who is responsible for grants 
and other related issues—believes that he or she should be listed as an 
inventor on every patent application coming out of the laboratory. But as 
harmless an exercise in vanity as this may seem, it can invalidate the pa-
tent.78 Accordingly, it is critical for patent applicants and their assignees 
to diligently ensure that all and only those who made substantial contri-
butions to the invention are listed as inventors on the patent application. 
For our purposes, it is critical to separate inventorship from owner-
ship. Inventors may be only natural persons and their names must remain 
on the patent document even if they assign (sell) it to someone else. By 
contrast, anyone, including corporate persons, can own patents. The Pa-
tent Act gives patents the attributes of personal property, meaning that 
they are freely alienable.79 Inventors can assign their patents, as well as 
grant exclusive licenses under them, so long as such assignments and 
exclusive licenses are in writing.80 The Patent Act provides that any “cer-
tificate of acknowledgment under the hand and official seal of a person 
authorized to administer oaths” in the United States or abroad is prima 
facie evidence of an assignment or license.81 Accordingly, natural-person 
inventors can never give up attribution rights as the inventors, and no one 
                                                 
 76. 35 U.S.C. § 116. 
 77. Id. §§ 116, 256, 262. 
 78. Misjoinder and nonjoinder can be remedied under the correction-of-inventorship statutory 
provision of 35 U.S.C. § 256. But there must have been no deceptive intent behind the misjoinder or 
nonjoinder. Id. A court can order the correction of inventorship upon a finding that a true inventor 
was omitted or an illegitimate inventor was listed, so long as no deceptive intent was found. Id. In 
this way, the patent can be saved from invalidation during an infringement proceeding. Thus, mis-
joinder and nonjoinder are not necessarily fatal to a patent owner’s infringement suit, but the added 
complexity is surely not worth the convenience of informality by the patent applicant beforehand. 
 79. Id. § 261. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. But the Patent Act also provides a bona fide purchaser defense where an assignee’s title 
is contested by another who claims to be an assignee if (1) the latter did not record the assignment in 
the USPTO within three months from either the date of its purported receipt of assignment or before 
the later assignee’s receipt of assignment; and (2) the former had no actual, constructive, or implied 
knowledge of the assignment to the latter. Id. 
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can take that from them, even after they have sold the ownership rights to 
the patent to someone else. 
While the Patent Act establishes the nature and requirements of 
ownership, assignments, and licenses, it is not the exclusive source of 
law for these transactions because the contracts and equitable relation-
ships underlying them are governed by state and federal common law.82 
If there is an express contract, then these federal and state common law 
contract principles govern its interpretation.83 But in the absence of a 
written agreement, things get interesting. A tripartite scheme of default 
common law rules, often mistakenly referred to in toto as “shop rights,” 
governs how and when employees must assign or license their inventions 
to their employers. The leading case on shop rights is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,84 which 
details this tripartite system. The first part is the true shop right: where an 
employee uses his or her employer’s resources or time to invent, the em-
ployee may retain title but must grant a perpetual, nonexclusive, non-
transferable license to the shop.85 It is important that the license not be 
transferable, and questions have arisen as to whether a shop right can 
survive the acquisition of the firm by another firm or any other succes-
sion of ownership in which a material change of control takes place.86 
The second part is the hired-to-invent exception to the shop right: when 
the employee was specifically hired to invent the sort of thing ultimately 
invented, title to the invention will equitably vest in the employer.87 The 
challenge with this part is the evidentiary support required of employers 
to show that an employee was specifically hired to invent a kind of good 
or service.88 The third part has no specific name, but it addresses situa-
tions where employees invent on their own time and with their own re-
sources, and where the employee was not hired to invent that kind of 
thing.89 In these instances, employees retain their titles free and clear, 
                                                 
 82. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 83. Id. 
 84. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). Note that Dubilier in-
volved federal-government employees and was decided before a presidential executive order estab-
lished the requisite writing to supersede the common law default rules as to government employees 
and their inventions. See id. Thus, ironically, Dubilier does not currently control the disposition of 
rights in inventions created by government employees, but it does control the disposition of rights in 
inventions created by employees of other organizations where no other written agreement or binding 
policy was in place. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Roche Molecular Sys., 583 F.3d at 832. 
 87. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. at 178. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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with no licenses necessarily granted to their employers (unless the em-
ployees decide to grant them). 
For our purposes, the issue raised by the shop-rights doctrine’s 
hired-to-invent exception is that some parties have attempted to make it 
into a patent-law version of WMFH. It is not. The clear difference is that 
the natural-person inventors remain as inventors and must be listed in the 
patent. Thus, the doctrine has no effect on inventorship. The hired-to-
invent exception affects only allocation of ownership of the invention 
and any patent arising from the invention. While this might seem to be a 
distinction without a material difference because the exclusive rights and 
economic rents flowing from the patent are still transferred, such a view 
overlooks the significant value that many inventors place on their attribu-
tion as inventors.90 Promotions and accolades in industry, government, 
and academia can flow in part from being named as an inventor on an 
important patent.91 Under the WMFH doctrine in the copyright system, 
no such attribution need be given to the natural-person creators, and so 
they must forego these other benefits. If they assign or license the copy-
right instead, where it is not a WMFH, they can contractually require the 
assignee or licensee to give them attribution. Note also that the Copyright 
Act does not require the listing of the author anywhere, but only the cop-
yright owner. Thus, an assignment can result in the assignee being able 
to register the copyright in only the assignee’s name, with no record of 
the author (be it a corporate or a natural person). Interestingly, no termi-
nation right for assignments or licenses analogous to that of the Copy-
right Act exists in the Patent Act. 
V. UNIFYING ALLOCATIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENT 
     RIGHTS THROUGH THE MEANS OF INNOVATION AND 
INNOVATION-PRODUCER CONSTRUCTS 
As set forth above, there are two ways in which corporate persons 
can control authorship and inventorship rights. The first way is if the 
corporation receives ownership, control, or authorization from natural 
persons affiliated with the corporation. In this case, the authorship or 
inventorship is initially attributable to the natural persons and must be 
conveyed to the corporation. This is what happens in the case of assign-
ments of patents or copyrights. The second way is if the authorship or 
inventorship is attributable to the corporate person initially. This is what 
happens in WMFH. Under current law, it cannot happen for 
inventorship. 
                                                 
 90. See FISK, supra note 67, at 251–55. 
 91. Id.; see also Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
1242 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1227 
Why does this distinction matter? First, it matters because attribu-
tion, which can be equally important as or even more important than 
economic rights, hangs in the balance. Second, the initial attribution of 
authorship or inventorship to the corporate person makes it seem as if we 
really do believe that the corporate person is equivalent to a natural per-
son in all senses, including having the ability to create. For example, I 
encourage students in my business and entrepreneurship law courses to 
treat the corporate entity as if it is an actual extra person in the room to 
drive home the professional responsibility aspects of working with cor-
porate clients. But I do not believe, nor do I expect them to believe, that 
the entity truly is a distinct being with existence in the physical (or even 
metaphysical) world. Further, I do not believe that any contemporary 
jurist or layperson believes that the corporation has corporeal or spiritual 
existence.92 Third, the distinction matters because we currently use con-
ceptualizations of corporations to justify different legal constructs that 
should have the same underlying rationale. 
Assuming that we do need to rationalize our notions of authorship 
and inventorship, the remainder of this Part argues that we should leave 
attribution initially with natural persons only. This avoids the awkward 
ontological and metaphysical issues of elevating a legal fiction to an ac-
tual being on par with a natural person. It is also consistent with Lord 
Coke’s pronouncement that corporations “cannot commit treason, nor be 
outlawed, nor excommunicated, for they have no souls.”93 I would add 
that corporations as legal constructs simply cannot invent or author (in 
the contemporary use of the latter term) because they are not sentient, 
creative beings. This position also recognizes the high value that we cur-
rently place on expression and products of the human mind, as well as 
the individuals who produce these products. 
                                                 
 92. O’Melinn argued that Chief Justice Marshall believed corporations were immortal beings 
with souls based on the latter’s statements in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). O’Melinn, supra note 7, at 207. O’Melinn relied on Marshall’s statement that 
“[i]t is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and 
capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of 
individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being.” 
Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636. But I do not think that Marshall intended anyone to 
think he was saying that corporations are literally immortal beings. Marshall said that corporations 
act “like one immortal being,” not “as one immortal being.” See id. I am less sure what O’Melinn 
himself believes the ontological status of corporations to be, as his article argued that corporations 
are neither concessions of the state nor nexuses of contracts, but instead some kind of immortal or 
ensouled being. O’Melinn, supra note 7, at 207. 
 93. The Case of Sutton’s Hosp., (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973. O’Melinn used this quote 
to illustrate the backdrop against which Marshall’s “revolution” in American corporations law, in 
which corporations are elevated to the status of real beings, ostensibly occurred. O’Melinn, supra 
note 7, at 207. 
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At the same time, we should allow the corporate person to receive 
control and ownership of (or authorization for) products of the human 
mind generated by natural persons. This especially makes sense for 
“propertized” products such as those represented by patents and copy-
rights. Reasons why we should allow for the transfer of ownership but 
not for the attribution of rights flow from the constructs of the means of 
innovation and innovation producer that I address elsewhere.94 The re-
mainder of this Part summarizes these constructs and then uses them to 
justify transfer-of-ownership rights, but not attribution rights, for prod-
ucts of the human mind. 
Methods are central to everything we do as creative humans. While 
we often focus on the artifacts we produce, those artifacts have their val-
ue in the overarching method of which they are but one component. For 
example, medicine is not an end in and of itself, but instead a component 
of a means of treating a patient. Even fine-arts artifacts that seem to exist 
for their own aesthetic value can be seen as part of a larger method to 
please, calm, enlighten, disturb, provoke, etc. At the same time, I define 
innovation as the design of new problem solving methods, rather than 
simply the production of new things. Thus, the use of existing problem-
solving methods to address a particular issue is not innovative. But creat-
ing a new means to address that issue is. 
The processes of designing and using new problem solving meth-
ods are the means of innovation: a neologism I coined in my forthcoming 
book to evoke and update the Marxist Industrial Age means of produc-
tion for the Information Age.95 These processes are their own higher or-
der, or more abstract method, similar to design principles. At the most 
abstract level are “meta methods” that are broadly directed toward, and 
thus identify, specific ends. “Art” is the meta-method of manipulating 
physical or mental objects for specific ends, drawing on the term’s older 
and broader sense as the root of artifice, artificial, artisanal, and artifact. 
“Science” is the meta-method of acquiring purely contemplative 
knowledge about the world around us, drawing similarly on an older and 
broader sense of that word from its root of to scire, or “to know.” “Tech-
nology” is literally the meta-method of a “science of techné,” where 
techné is the ancient Greek term for artisanal activities in which artisans 
had a rational system of knowledge and methods to produce their results. 
Thus, the science of techné being developed under the original develop-
ment and use of the term technology was to be a systematic study of 
techné itself. An alternate use later developed to mean the application of 
                                                 
 94 . SEAN M. O’CONNOR, METHODOLOGY: ART, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
MEANS OF INNOVATION (forthcoming 2013). 
 95. Id. The means of production were physical assets, like factories, labor, and capital. 
1244 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1227 
knowledge from the new sciences of the early modern period to acceler-
ate artisanal innovation. And finally, “law” is the meta-method of order-
ing relationships among people and objects. 
Just as the question of control of the means of production was one 
of the defining issues of the Industrial Age, so arguably will the question 
of control of the means of innovation be one of the defining issues of the 
Information Age. Already, we see passionate debates over whether pa-
tents should be issued on tax-compliance methods, genetic-diagnostic 
test methods, science-research methods, business methods, and even le-
gal methods such as filing patent applications. Each of these is currently 
debated as a stand-alone issue. Yet, clearly they are all united by the 
power of methods and the concern over their ownership and control. 
Likewise, there are pitched debates over whether noncompete agree-
ments and other methods of controlling the movement of creative class 
workers should be allowed, limited, or outright prohibited.96 These are all 
really questions about control of the means of innovation. 
Related to the means of innovation and my focus on methods over 
artifacts is the concept of the “innovation producer.” This role is different 
from that of the inventor and is closer in some ways to the old notion of 
“author” as the authority under which a project was done.97 The innova-
tion producer is the person who can bring together all the resources 
needed to develop an idea or vision into something that can be produced 
at a cost that makes it reasonably accessible to the market. This is simply 
the abstraction of various specific production roles, such as that of a 
movie producer, music producer, academic research lab director, etc. 
Thomas Edison was more of an innovation producer than an inventor 
because in addition to his vision of what products were needed, he ex-
celled at bringing together people and materials. This skill allowed Edi-
son to turn inventions and know-how into useful products such as a 
commercially viable electric light bulb.98 Likewise, the great artists of 
the Renaissance and early modern periods were innovation producers 
who had sizeable staff and resources to help them realize their grand ar-
tistic visions.99 
What does all of this mean for our question of attribution? It means 
that the innovation producer and key team members will demand attribu-
                                                 
 96. See, e.g., Matthew Marx et al., Noncompetes and Inventor Mobility: Specialists, Stars, and 
the Michigan Experiment (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-042, 2012), available at http:// 
www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-042.pdf. 
 97. See supra Part II. 
 98. Contrary to popular belief, neither Edison nor his lab invented the electric light bulb. In-
stead, they discovered the first filament that had a long enough life to make the electric light vacuum 
bulb commercially viable. See, e.g., The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
 99. See FISK, supra note 67. 
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tion in part because it is their prime credential. But it also means that 
control of the innovations needs to be captured by the entities through 
which innovation producers develop their work. Otherwise, projects will 
not be realized because fragments of IP will be vested in different places. 
Thus, the natural persons associated with an entity initially will get at-
tribution, even though they may have already conveyed their economic 
or other legal rights to the entity. 
To effect the changes suggested here, Congress would need to 
amend the WMFH provisions of the Copyright Act eliminating the right 
of the hiring party to be the author. Instead, the hiring party would be 
only the mandatory assignee. Further, a provision would need to be add-
ed to grant inalienable rights of attribution to the natural-person creators 
of copyrightable works, similar to the requirements of the Patent Act.100 
At the same time, the Patent Act should be amended to require that in-
ventions created by employees within the scope of their employment be 
deemed to have been assigned to their employers. This provision should 
be drafted to expressly preempt state common law, including the shop-
rights system. There remains an open question regarding whether, and in 
what manner, parties should be allowed to contract around these statuto-
ry default rules of ownership and attribution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the inconsistent theorization of corporate person-
hood, authorship, and inventorship presents real problems that are mani-
fested in the very different systems of copyright and patent law with re-
gard to ownership and attribution of products of human creativity. This 
Essay rejected the notion that corporate persons can be deemed to have 
been endowed with the creative faculties of sentient humans for purposes 
of legal attribution of authorship or inventorship. Further, such a bizarre 
legal fiction does significant harm to the creative natural persons who 
increasingly must sell their creative faculties—rather than simply their 
labor—to employers. Creative persons need to secure attribution for their 
works, as such credit must be represented in their resumes and profes-
sional portfolios to ensure that they remain viable in the job market. At 
the same time, firms that serve as innovation producers need to have cer-
tainty as to their ability to control the exclusive rights of ownership over 
copyrights and patents. Firms may invest significant time and resources 
into hiring, supporting, and guiding creative persons in order to develop 
new goods and services based on new IP. In this way, the questions of 
allocation of ownership and attribution for creative output are central to 
                                                 
 100. See supra Part IV. 
1246 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1227 
the issue of who controls the means of innovation. The latter question, in 
turn, is becoming central to the socio-legal-political debates of the twen-
ty-first century. In conclusion, this Essay argues that Congress should 
amend the Patent Act and Copyright Act to grant inalienable rights of 
attribution for creative works to the natural-person creators, while simul-
taneously creating a default rule that ownership rights accrue to the hir-
ing party. 
